Over the last decades, there has been plenty of research and publications on Political Business Cycles (PBC), aiming at analyzing and explaining the use of fiscal and monetary instruments to stimulate economic growth before elections, with the intention to impress potential voters. Previous research on PBC in Albania reveals clear evidence of fiscal expansion before elections but no significant changes in the output (GDP) and inflation as theory predicts. One possible explanation of this result could be found in economic agents' expectations, which is also subject of this paper. We analyze consumers' expectations before elections, the main factors underlying expectations and the way these expectations influence their behavior toward spending, and consequently the macroeconomic outcomes, deploying standard econometric methods widely applied in PBC related research. According to our research results, households consumption spending decreases before elections because of higher uncertainty about their future economic situation due to the highly politicized public employment.
Introduction
Over the last decades, there has been plenty of research and articles published on Political Business Cycles (PBC), aiming to analyze and explain the use of fiscal and monetary policy instruments by the incumbent to stimulate economic performance before elections in order to impress the voters. The pioneering work of Nordhaus (1975) points out that governments (incumbent politicians) may behave opportunistically prior to elections in order to please the voters by engaging in expansionary economic policies to increase the output and decrease unemployment, however, creating opportunistic Political Business Cycles. Researchers have also investigated how the economic performance influences elections outcomes; nevertheless, this approach is not subject of our research.
In the case of Albania, Imami and Lami (2006) and Lami et al. (2008) found clear evidence of political cycles in fiscal policy instruments but not in monetary ones.
Interestingly, the significant increase of some main components of public expenditures prior to elections, intrinsically with high aggregate demand multiplier such as capital expenditures, did not lead to considerable statistically significant change in output, unemployment and inflation as predicted by opportunistic political business cycles theory. There could be several reasons and explanations. One possible explanation might be related to expectations. Expectations are already an essential issue and field of research in modern and political economics. As Motoshi (1992: pp 994) has stated, "Political business cycles can, and should be analyzed in conjunction with voters' subjective perceptions that count in elections."
This explanation motivated us to conduct further research, which may throw new light into PBC theory and empirics. In this paper, we focus on the importance and role of households' economic expectations in the context of elections and their impact on PBC.
Thereby, we focus on the employment uncertainty due to the risk of a political rotation or re-composition of the government/incumbent coalition. This uncertainty may suppress consumption, in this way consequently offsetting the incumbent's intended effects of expansionary fiscal policy on macroeconomic outcomes.
The hypothesis of this study is that households' consumption is reduced before elections. The reduction in consumption prior to elections may be caused by increased uncertainty of consumers, as regards their future economic situation and incomes. One of the main underlying factors explaining the deterioration in consumers' expectations before elections in case of Albania, and as a consequence reduction of consumption before elections, might be the highly politicized practice of hiring and firing employees in the public sector. We empirically test for a reduction in consumption and deterioration in consumers' confidence before elections. If our hypothesis holds that might be a reasonable explanation for non-evidence of variation in economic outcomes (GDP, inflation) before elections as PBC theory predicts, in spite of significant empirical evidence revealing the incumbents efforts to achieve such an increase in output through different budgetary instruments they control.
In the following Section we provide an overview on the PBC theory and related empirical results, as well as we explain our hypothesis. Third section provides relevant background information about Albania including also the description of the current situation in public administration and evidence of political interference. Data, variables and methodology employed in this study are explained in the fourth section. Empirical findings of the study are presented in Chapter 5, while Chapter 6 embarks some issues for discussion and conclusions.
Theoretical Background and Research Hypothesis
The phenomenon of manipulation of the economy by the incumbent for electoral purpose, also known as Political Business Cycles, was firstly introduced in a formal model by Nordhaus (1975) . Using expansionary monetary policies, incumbent politicians manipulate the economy to gain electoral advantage by producing a pre-election boom associated with a reduced unemployment rate and probably higher inflation afterwards. In his theoretical model of PBC, Nordhaus indicates that the incumbent may receive more votes from "myopic voters", who are influenced more by the most recent economic performance and discount the past economic results, if it succeeds to increase output (income) and decrease unemployment in the period of time close to the upcoming elections. Meanwhile, the assumption that the economy in the short run works within the framework of a short run Philips curve implies a time-lagged increase in inflation, which in turn makes the wining politicians to return to a more contracting policy stance after elections in order to ensure macroeconomic stability.
Several other studies took up the idea of a manipulative opportunistic behavior of incumbents to induce economic expansions before elections. The empirical evidence for such Political Business Cycle was rather mixed. Especially in developed countries was found only limited evidence.
1 Based on these aspects, two main adjustments emerged.
Firstly, the analyses focused more on the question of instruments, especially fiscal ones, and less on the economic outcome. Secondly, the motivation of manipulation is discussed in a different manner, shifting from opportunistic approach with myopic voters to a rational voter behavior.
Assuming a rational behavior, voters should base their decision on the expected policy of a candidate after the election rather on the past or present results. Furthermore, voters should be able to anticipate the implications of any expansionary policy and punish the intended manipulative policies. A possible explanation of an expansionary fiscal policy even in case of rational voters is provided by Rogoff (1990) and Rogoff and Sibert (1988) . Considering limited information of the voters about the competence of politicians, they argue that incumbents may use increased public expenditure as a signaling of competence, as they are able to provide a higher level of the observed expenditures.
Another approach is taken by Brender and Dazen (2005) and Shi and Svensson (2006) , showing that new democracies, as transition countries, are particularly vulnerable to political budget cycles. Brender and Dazen (2005) stressed the lack of experience that voters have in new democracies regarding the existence of political fiscal cycles. Closely related to this idea is the approach of Alt and Lassen (2006) . They also consider imperfect information of voters; however, they pronounce the relevance of transparency, which often lacks in transition countries. Meanwhile, Shi and Svensson (2006) consider as a relevant aspect not only the aspect of information, but also the incumbents' rents of staying in power. Hallenberg et al. (2002) analysed the policy in 10 EU accession countries. Based on the extended Mundell-Fleming model of Clark and Hallerberg (2000) , they argued that fiscal policy before election depends also on the exchange rate regime and the independency of the central bank. In the case of Albania, empirical research reveals results which are only partially in line with opportunistic PBC theory. According to Imami and Lami (2006) there is clear evidence of political budget cycles in Albania, which is in line with the theory developed by Brender and Dazen (2005) and Shi and Svensson (2006) . They find sufficient evidences of temporary increases in the main budgetary components before elections in Albania. Public investment increases one year before elections, intensifying in magnitude closer to the elections, culminating one quarter before elections. Meanwhile, in the two subsequent quarters after elections a statistically significant contraction of public investments takes place. The same was also found valid for compensation of public budgetary employees, which is another important budgetary instrument controlled by the incumbent with presumably considerable direct impact on the aggregate demand.
Compensation of employees statistically increased one year before general elections, while stopped immediately after elections. 2 Imami and Lami (2006) were not able to show any statistically significant evidence for any election related monetary cycles.
Despite a flexible exchange rate regime, given the relative independence of the Albanian Central Bank, these results are in line with Hallenberg et al. (2002) .
Interestingly, the significant increase of public investment and extended use of other fiscal instruments in Albania prior to elections did not lead to significant change in the economic output (GDP) and inflation (CPI) as would have been expected based on PBC theory. More specifically for the case of GDP, only one quarter following elections the sign of election related dummy variable was significant (Imami and Lami 2006, p.61) .
There is no statistically significant increase of GDP before elections in any of the preelectoral periods of time as modelled by the respective dummy variables.
These observations lead to the conclusion that Albania as a new democracy is vulnerable for political budget cycles; however, an additional mechanism may offset the expansive impact of the opportunistic fiscal policy toward macroeconomic outcomes, particularly toward output. Assuming that (net) exports are not affected by elections, besides public expenditures, other components of the aggregate demand that can change can be consumption or households' expenditure, and/or investments.
In Albania, the politicized economic environment, especially concerning the employment in public sector, could worsen consumer confidence and reduce consumption expenditures before elections, and, as a consequence, offsetting the intended effects of political budget cycles engineered by incumbents toward economic outcomes.
It is rational for the Albanian households to expect that if there will be a rotation or re-composition of the incumbent government many public employees may lose their jobs.
The afterward classical period of frictional unemployment is expected to be very long in an economic environment of high unemployment.
Based on the permanent income hypothesis, the actual consumption depends also on the financial situation in the future. Higher risk of getting unemployed in the near future may imply an increase in actual private savings and consequently a reduction in actual private consumption before elections. For the special case of transition countries, we have also to take into account the specific situation of high uncertainty concerning the economic situation in the upcoming years. Therefore, it is rational to assume a relatively high discount rate concerning future income. Thereby, the consumption decision depends mainly on the actual income and the expected income for the upcoming period.
Households being potentially affected by such political change will anticipate the high risk of a longer period of unemployment by tending to save more and spend less in the months or quarters before elections, consequently affecting the aggregate demand and contracting output during that period. 3 Hence, we keep the assumption that voters are short-sighted, which may refer to a lack of experience and transparency. Consequently, voters are interested only in the actual macroeconomic position at the day of voting while are not aware about the government manipulative expansive fiscal policy and its future effects. Nevertheless, at their individual microeconomic situation, they take into account the possible impact of the upcoming election on their employment and income situation. While economic policy and its impact on the economy can be quite far away to a "typical" household, the risk and threat to lose jobs is a tangible experience. The implication of becoming unemployed is a widespread experience in transition countries.
Economic and political background of Albania
In (Table 1) .
However, during the last financial crisis, the lack of integration was an advantage Public sector Non-agricultural private sector Agricultural private sector
Source: INSTAT (2013) As shown by Figure 1 , the Albanian public sector still employs a relatively high number of people, only about 20 percent less than the non-agriculture private sector.
Although, agriculture remains the main sector by employment, it counts only for a quarter of gross value added of total production in 1999 and further decreasing to a fifth in 2010/11 (INSTAT, 2013) . This discrepancy reflects also the problem of hidden unemployment in Albania. Quite often, people return home in the rural areas if they do not find a job in the cities or abroad. In this case they are no longer counted in the official statistics as unemployed while increasing the employment in the agricultural sector, which consider self-employed people who are entitled to agriculture land. Furthermore, concerning the public sector, we have to take into account that average wages in the public sector during the last decade have been around 20% higher compared to nonagricultural private sector and far higher than implicit wage or gross value added per employee in the agricultural private sector (INSTAT 2013 Albanian public administration remains substantially politicized, and often appointments of public servants are politically based. 5 Based on study of Albanian Human Rights Group concerning the parliamentary election in 2009, the majority of public administrational employees were also activists of the party governing the related public institution. As they state furthermore, "Accordingly, the working years in the respective institution were the same as the years of governing of the party they were 
Data, Variables and Methodology
We expect and empirically test that households decrease their consumption expenditures before elections due to increased uncertainty and lower confidence about their economic and financial situation. Reduced consumption (at least partially) offsets in this way the intended effects on final macroeconomic outcomes, which incumbents try to achieve by opportunistically manipulating different budgetary policy instruments they control, as shown by the existing empirical research findings (Imami, Lami 2006 Therefore, a simple formal representation of the intervention analysis in this study is: Specifically, equation (1) represents the case when cumulative dummy variables are used, as they are introduced and estimated separately (one at a time) in the econometrical model. Whereas in case of discrete dummy variables a summation symbolic should be introduced in the expression, as discrete dummies from each set (before or after election)
are simultaneously introduced and estimated. For the set of discrete dummies before election we have the following equation:
While (j) equals (1, 2,…,6) if equation (2) is representing discrete periods of time after elections.
Based on the Box -Jenkins methodology (Box-Jenkins 1970) and intervention analysis (Box Tiao 1975) , the same econometrical procedure was applied to empirically analyse each variable of interest. First, we checked for the stationarity of each time series by utilizing several statistical tests for the presence of unit roots. 8 In -6, -5, …, -1, 1, 2,…,6) .
Empirical Results and Findings
Econometrical results on RTI indicated that all cumulative dummy variables prior to elections had negative signs, in line with our hypothesis of lower consumption before elections, and four out of six were statistically significant at conventional levels ( Table   2 ). Estimated parameters of PD -1 and PD -6 were not significant at conventional levels, although negative. It is very common that one or two months before elections considerable amount of electoral campaign spending take place with potentially significant positive impact on final consumption. It is also shown that other politically influenced variables (fiscal instruments, etc.) reach their zenith in the election quarter (Imami, Lami, 2006) with potential direct and indirect positive impact on consumption.
That might be a possible explanation for PD -1 non-significance, which could have been even statistically positive in absence of assumed prudent spending behavior from the consumers. While the non-significance of PD -6 might be explained by the relatively long time ahead of elections it represents (one and a half year). None of PD j estimated parameters was significantly positive contradicting our hypothesis. These empirical results imply a contraction in household consumption of approximately 7.6% during six months before elections as compared to the natural pattern of this time process; there is a contraction of approximately 5% (+/-1%) during other pre-defined cumulative periods of time ahead of elections. In order to investigate for the intensity of the contracting behavior in household consumption as the elections day approach, we employed the six discrete dummy variables (PDd j ), defined in the previous section. All six PDd j (j = -6,-5,…,-1) were simultaneously incorporated into ARMA(0,12) model and re-estimated all parameters of the final model. Only PDd -2 coefficient was negatively significant, while PDd -6 was positively significant (Table 3) . 10 We removed the insignificant variables from the model and the results remained the same. Therefore, there is no statistical evidence that the contraction of consumption intensifies as elections day approaches. Neither is clear evidence of significant contraction of consumption on each separate quarter.
Hence we can conclude that there is empirical evidence of lower consumption before the election, as captured by cumulative PD j variables. Nevertheless, reduction in household consumption prior to election is only gradual and there isn't almost any statistically significant evidence of decrease in consumption during each separate (discrete) quarterly period of time ahead of elections, except the second quarter prior to elections (PDd -2 ) which is significantly negative at 5 percent level. The election related cyclicality of household consumption, as assumed by the hypothesis of this study, was also supported by empirical evidence of consumption's patterns after election. There was no statistically significant effect captured by any of the PD j variables (j=1, 2,…, 6) defined to model different cumulative periods of time after election (Table 4 ). The contraction of consumption which was empirically evident before election seizes to exist immediately after election. The consumption pattern after election is modeled only through the ARMA model, while any other variable which aims to capture the post-election effects on consumption was resulting redundant, implying that consumption behavior returns to its "natural" dynamic after election. As stated in the hypothesis of this study, we expect that deteriorating consumers' expectations and higher perceived uncertainty before election are the main factors leading to reduced household consumption. To test this part of our hypothesis, we empirically analyze the behavior of consumers' confidence during elections as regards their economic and financial situation in the future. Specifically, we analyzed two time series indices, CCI and CEFS, as explained in section 4.
Based on the Box -Jenkins methodology (Box-Jenkins 1970) and intervention analysis (Box Tiao 1975) , we incorporated all six discrete PDd j variables (j = -6,-5,…,-1) into "the best" tentatively found models for the CCI and CEFS time series, respectively ARMA(0,1) for CCI and a moving average term of lag 2 for CEFS. All parameters of the final models were re-estimated and were subject to statistical inference. In the same manner, we incorporated the set of six post-electoral discrete PDd j variables (j = 1, 2,…, The other analyzed sub-index, CEFS, revealed almost the same statistical results.
Constant
Three out of six dummy variables, respectively PDd -2 , PDd -3 , and PDd -6 , were significantly negative, providing clear evidence of higher uncertainty and deteriorating expectation before elections ( Table 5 ). None of estimated dummy parameters was significantly positive, not contradicting the hypothesis of the study. Dynamic of CCI and CEFS after election add further evidence to election related cyclicality of consumers' expectations. All estimated parameters of PDd j (j = 1, 2, …, 6) seize to be significantly negative after elections as opposed to the period before election ( In overall, this empirical evidence implied that deteriorated consumers' confidence before elections lead to lower household consumption. Lower consumption before elections acts as a counterbalancing force to the intended effects of incumbents on macroeconomic outcomes through opportunistic decisions on different policy instrument they control.
Discussion and Conclusions
Incumbents increase public expenditures before elections aiming to temporarily stimulate economic growth to impress voters. However, output is not affected only by fiscal policies alone but also by other factors outside incumbents' control, such as households' expectations and their spending decisions. Possible political rotation may be associated with job losses by a substantial number of people in the public administration, which is a key employer in Albania. Consequently, consumers are concerned about the upcoming elections and the higher job loss risk leads to increased savings and decreased consumption before elections. The contraction in private consumption may arise not only due to the dismissal process after a possible change in the government but also by the higher risk of staying unemployed for a longer period. While the first aspect may be the case also in developed countries, the combination of both aspects is a special feature in developing countries. In turn, potentially affected people may decide to reduce their expenditures, anticipating hard times. Contraction in private consumption may offset the effects of expansionary fiscal policy before elections.
There is sufficient empirical evidence to conclude that prior to elections there is a contraction in retail trade and by implication in the final consumption. That is supported also by empirical evidence of deteriorating consumer confidence (expectations) before elections which could be the main factor leading to reduced consumption. 
